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Aristotle metaphysics hackett pdf

THIS IS NDPR'S LAST REVIEW FOR 2016. WE WILL RESUME PUBLISHING ON JANUARY 10, 2017 HAPPY HOLIDAYS AND A BRIGHT NEW YEAR TO ALL OUR READERS! The thesis we know as Aristotle's metaphysics is central to both teaching and research aristotle. Hackett produces usable, affordable translations of ancient texts, mainly aimed at teachers and students and secondary to researchers. This text is in that tradition (p. xviii). The price point is higher than some student texts, but still reasonable if this was the main text for a course at Aristotle. Typically, C.D. C. Reeve controls the competing demands of these two audiences well, especially when it comes to translation. In this review, I first mention some existing English translations of Aristotle's metaphysics. Secondly, I describe the structure and content of Reeves' version. Third, I discuss the character of Reeves notes, which is the primary apparatus he uses to guide us through the metaphysics of his translation. Fourth, to show the benefits of Reeves's approach, I comment in detail about his translation and discussion about Metaphysics Zeta. Existing translations Several English translations of the entire metaphysics are already available. Perhaps the most widely used are W. D. Ross' 1941, available in Jonathan Barnes' Complete Works, and Hugh Tredennick's 1933 for the Loeb Classical Library. There are two full-text translates available in trade paperback: H. C. Lawson-Tancred's 1998 for Penguin and Joe Sachs' 1999 for the Green Lion. Frequently used partial translations include Montgomery Furth's 1985 of books Zeta, Eta, Theta and Iota, also from Hackett. Clarendon's Aristotle series features: Arthur Madigan's Beta and Kappa 1-2; Christopher Kirwan's Gamma, Delta and Epsilon; David Bostock's Zeta and Eta; Stephen Makins Theta; Julia Annas' Mu and Nu. Reeve often takes these translations and comments into account, as well as Bostock on Zeta and Eta and Michael Frede and Günther Patzig on Zeta. Below, when comparing Reeves translation with others, I discuss Tredennick and Ross, the most comparable full-text translations. Structure and content Reeve introduces Aristotle's life, the project of metaphysics and who may have been the audience. A 250-page translation based on Werner Jaeger's 1957 edition of Oxford Classical Texts follows, although Reeve often emends. 1644 endnotes follow, ordered sequentially. A two-page dictionary, two pages of further reading (no bibliography), a short index of names and a sixty-three-page index of English terms complete the book. Reeve tells us why he makes the translation choices he makes. He aims to compensate for the deceptive familiarity of traditional translations without alienating the distance of idiosyncratic (p. xvii). To do this, he aims for translations that are sensitive to philosophical use of a term. But, of course, what one takes philosophically use of a term to be depends one's interpretation. So to evaluate Reeves translation I have say something about the interpretation it reflects. Below I will use Zeta as a case study. Notes The notes dominate Reeves' text. He spreads superscript numbers across each page, while the endnotes make even paperback physically impressive. Imagine a translation sit by David Foster Wallace. Unlike wallaces, Reeves's end-noting is user-friendly: I turned happily back and forth without losing my place. The notes fall into five types: cross-references; alternative translations; textual emendations; quotes of parallel texts or old comments; philosophical explanations. Although Reeves' notes are extensive, he does not aim to make an exhaustive comment; Rather, he aims to provide a translation and explanations to help students and researchers. Cross-references, alternative translations and emendations do not need general remarks. But I want to say something about Reeves quotes and explanations. He tends to quote comparative texts of Aristotle in length. 'Can be taught' at 980b25 provokes a long note (Note 8, p. 256), quotes Sens. 1 436b18-437a17 on perceptual capacities. This can help the student: it is useful to have such parallels readily available. Reeves notes are a gold mine for the scientist, especially when he gives parallel texts or old comments. At 1021a11-14, Aristotle offers a bafflingly compressed recourse argument for the law on the excluded middle. In his Note 460 (p. 357) Reeve helpfully quotes Alexander (In. Met. 332.18-333.7, in Madigan translation), which offers a sensible interpretation. This is a welcome contrast to Ross's comment, which often relies on Alexander but does not help us engage with the old commentary tradition. Largely because of Richard Sorabji's efforts, the old commentary tradition plays an increasingly important role in research on Aristotle, and Reeve distributes this material admirably. In general, Reeves's explanations are useful, but some miss the mark. When 'epistēmē' first appears on 981a1-2 (Note 11, p. 257-261), he lays out the syllogistic system of Prior Analytics I, 1-7. But Reeve is very much under-explaining it. He only gives the first character moods, but does not explain what a e 'i' 'o' means and uses technical terms 'Camestres' and 'Cesare' without explanation. The expert does not need this, but the beginner will be confused. Book Zeta Whether you are considering Reeves text for teaching, research or both, you will be interested in his treatment of Metaphysics Book Zeta, Aristotle's discussion of substance. Book Zeta opens with the idea that there are several ways things are said to be, but says that one of these meanings is primary: what-it-is sense. This leads Aristotle to keep that question 'what is to be?' is just the question 'what is substance?'. In English, it's hard to see why Aristotle thinks you can just replace the question 'what is to be?' with the question 'what is substance?'. At least the in Zeta 1 not this move. But in Greek, the slide is obvious: ousia, ('substance') is simply the abstract noun formed from 'on' (being). ousia is just being in the most general aspects. To ask what ousia is, is just to ask what the most general aspect of being. Reeve translates with the traditional drug (for ousia) and being (for on)). Not a misleading choice, given the translation tradition, but it shows Reeves' preference for traditional translations when it suits his needs. The main discussions about Zeta 3-13 focus on mapping four options for what the drug in one thing is: the essence (to ten an einai), the universal (to katholou), the genus (to genos), and the underlying subject (to hupokeimenon). Zeta 3 discusses this last option. Form, matter and composed of the two are considered underlying (1029a2-4), but which is the candidate drug? One option is prime matter, which Aristotle suggests as a thought experiment (1029a23, Note 629, p. 402). Prime matter is not even contingent on anything, but things are contingent on first-class matter. So prime mats have no features in themselves, but only have some features coincidentally. If you are the kind of thinker who wants the underlying subject of something to be the substance of something, prime matter is your candidate substance (1029a26). But Aristotle believes that this is impossible (1029a28). Why? Reeve translates: (T1) In fact, separability and being one this something (sic) seems to belong most of all to substance, and because of this, the form and things composed of both seem to be substance more than matter is (1029a28-30. Trans. Reeve). The two comparable translations provide: (T1) For it is accepted that separability and individuality belong to particular substance. Therefore, it seems that the shape and combination of form and matter is more real substance than matter is (1029a28-30. Trans. Tredennick). (T1) For both separability and individuality is believed to belong mainly substance. And so the shape and composed of form and matter would be assumed to be substance, rather than matter (1029a28-30. Trans. Ross). Reeves translation is superior in some ways. Ross's translation of the second sentence misleads. It gives the impression that Aristotle believes the shape and hylomorphic compound taken together is substance, while Reeve, like Tredennick, communicates the correct comparative point that forms and the hylomorphic compound is each more likely to be substance than matter is. Although Tredennick and Ross translate the first sentence, a gar clause in Greek, with for, Reeve is different by choosing in fact. This is a significant disagreement. Most scientists believe that T1 offers Aristotle's reason for thinking that the matter, including prime mats, is not substance. Although the case is separate (some bronze can exist without being a statue) and the case is special (a lump of bronze, or a statue), the case is never both. In as far as the case is from form, the case is not an individual; in as far as bronze exists without form, there is no person. But the drug must be separated and special; So, matter can not be substance. [1] But at odds with the usual interpretation, Reeve translates as if T1 does not offer a basis at all (Note 694, p. 403). He translates the gar as fact and takes the impossibility of prime matter to be substance to have already been established at the Met. Z. 1029a18-26. Is Reeve's interpretation, and then translation, right? He argues that Aristotle claims that it is impossible that the main toe is substance elsewhere, on T2. Aristotle imagines a chain of preaching and then says: (T2) And then the last [in the series] will not be inherently anything, or a quantity, or anything else - nor denials of these, since they will also belong to it accidentally (1029a24-26. Trans. Reeve). Here are the comparators: (T2) Thus, the ultimate substrate itself is neither a specific thing nor a quantity or anything else. There are also no negations of these; for negations also will apply only to it accidentally (Trans. Tredennick). (T2) Therefore, the ultimate substrate itself is neither a particular thing nor of a particular quality nor otherwise positively characterized; nor negative, for negations will also belong to it only by accident (Trans. Ross). Again, Reeves translation is preferable. Both Tredennick and Ross translate using substrate or substratum, where the Greek actually has a term meaning the latter. Although in this context the latter may refer to a final substrate, the latter certainly does not mean substrate or anything similar. Although Reeve translation is superior, the argument about T2 must unpack (Note 693, p. 402). The latest in the series of, prime mats, can either (a) be conditional or (b) have something contingent on it. Tar (a), prime mats can be conditional in one of two ways: inherent or accidental. But the former is impossible since nothing has the main tram as an inherent feature. But prime matter can be conditional by chance. Tar (b), prime mats can not have inherent predicates, so only have random predicates. But according to Metaphysics F 4 (1007a33-b4), nothing has only random predicates, on the pain of infinite recourse. So something that is contingent on prime matter must be contingent on a subject of inherent predicates. But, Reeve believes, that the subject cannot be the main subject: if the main subject 'is not inherently something, there is nothing that it itself is - nothing as it is inherently identical'. So some predicates of prime mats need not belong to one and the same subject. I'm confused about how Reeve thinks Aristotle's argument works. It seems false that, just because prime mats can not be predicted inherently, it may not have any inherent predicates. Socrates can not be inherent, but may have inherent predicates. So on Reeve's construct, Aristotle's argument is unhealthy. But even if there was sound, on Reeves's reading, T2 misses the target. T2 argues that prime mats are not a proper topic. But Aristotle needs an argument that the main term is not substance. Now, if Aristotle believes being a drug involves being a subject, T2 is relevant: a drug is subject to; prime mats are not a topic; so, prime mats are not substance. But that's not how Reeve wants to read the passage: for Reeve, T2, instead of T1, should directly give the reasons for that main. Here we see another aspect of Reeve's translation strategy. In T1, Reeve used a non-standard translation of actual (for gar), one that supports his interpretation of the text, in the face of the translation tradition too. Does Reeves's translation? Well, a gar clause almost always provides the basis for what precedes it. We need strong reasons to favor a translation, like Reeves, that breaks that connection. I have suggested that Reeve's interpretation does not provide strong reasons. But in accordance with his principles, Reeve explains his translation so that we can decide for ourselves. As Zeta continues, form emerges as the main candidate for substance. Zeta 7-9, which resuffies matter-form compounds in detail, is often thought to be a later insertion. Reeve sums up the case judiciously case for and against (Note 736, p. 412). The launch of Zeta 7-9 is that the form of a matter form compound makes the connection what it is; no matter what does something what it is, is the essence; so, the shape is the essence. Zeta 10 and Zeta 11 discuss some puzzles about how shapes, essences and definitions relate, but by the end of Zeta 12 Aristotle seems to think of substance as a definable form (1037a25-30) and since universals are the candidates for definition, a significant form is a universal. Zeta 8 1034a6-8 confirms this, by claiming that Socrates and Callias are the same in form, but different in the case. Since two people share the

same shape, the significant form must be universal. But when Aristotle returns to consider universals as candidates in Zeta 13, he argues that it seems impossible for some of the things said [about something] universally to be a drug (1038b4-6). Aristotle's theory now seems to involve an inconsistent set of obligations: (1) all substances are forms; (2) all forms are universal; (3) no universal is a drug. I'll try to reconstruct and evaluate Reeves' approach to this infamous crux. [2] Reeve denies that Aristotle has (2). Some forms, the significant forms, are not universal. Why think Aristotle is making this move? Reeve argues this way. At the beginning of Zeta 13, Aristotle distinguishes two underlying topics that a universal can predict (1038b4-6): (1) one this something (tode ten) that underpins attributes; (2) the case that under the grounds of Universals apply to many underlyings. But the subjects that under the influence of universals must be these somethings, since matter can not be inherent many things (Note 884, p. 438). So forms are not universal because forms matter as an underlying topic. The case that under the influence of forms can not be many things, so forms can not belong to many things. So at least some forms are not universal. Since the substances are separate and individual (T1), and substances are forms, some non-universal forms can be significant forms. This is confirmed because: (T3) The substance in each thing is especially for it (idios), in that it does not belong to anything else (1038b9-10. Trans. Reeve.) T3 constitutes the claim that if x is the drug in y, then x is special for y. To give T3, Reeve follows readings given by Frede, Patzig and Bostock, against OCT. The OCT text will be rendered: (T3) The substance in each thing is what is special for it, which does not belong to anything else (Trans. Reeve). Unlike T3, T3 seems fake. T3' claims that if x is special for y, then x is the drug in y. But some special individuals are not drugs. Socrates' individual pallor is special for Socrates, but Socrates' pallor is not the content of Socrates. Again, Reeves's judgment is sound since he rightly prefers the Frede-Patzig-Bostock reading, which provides T3, and not OCT, which gives T3'. The significant form of x must be special for x. The content of each thing is unique. So, on Reeves's reading, significant forms must be unique to each thing, and so are not universals. There are some known problems with this type of approach. Fabrics are, for Aristotle, exemplary definable units, but non-universal are not definable; so significant forms end up not being definable. But there is a more particular problem with Reeves' approach. His view implies that Aristotle claims that no forms are universal. If all forms have something that under the influence of them, and anyway are many things, then no form has many things that under the influence of it. So no shapes are universals. But this is contradicted by Socrates and Callia's example of Z8 1034a6-8. While I am not convinced of the interpretation he offers at this point, I am convinced that Reeves's textual emendation and translation is correct. The conclusion Reeves emendations and translations are philosophically sensitive, and he carefully offers the options in his notes. I cannot blame his translation strategy, which balances literality and readability without sacrificing accuracy and allowing readers to evaluate their choices. The interpretive notes Reeve offers are useful, but are not intended to serve as a full comment. However, they will help students and provide a rich resource of inspiration for researchers. The learning, skill and range exhibited by Reeve is astounding. In short, if you teach or research Aristotle, Reeve offers a valuable addition to the English-language resources on metaphysics. [1] This is suggested by Cohen, S. Marc, Aristotle's metaphysics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [2] The way I set up this crux follows Cohen, S. Marc, Aristotle's metaphysics. Metaphysics.

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